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8448

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The purpose of this action is to determine and
establish by decree the relative rights of the parties to
the use of the waters of Thistle Creek from the SanpeteUtah County boundary line downstream to the mouth
of Nebo Creek.
The parties include all of the users along the stream
between those points.
The Lasson defendants own the ranches from the
County line down to The Spencer Eanch; then come
1
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Spencer, McKean, Mitchell and Siler, in the order named,
(R. 20). Siler is a necessary p a r t y ; his interests lie with
the plaintiffs, but he refused to join with us so we made
him a defendant. He defaulted.
Thistle Creek has its headwaters in Thistle Valley
in Sanpete County; two creeks, namely, Clear Creek
and Rock Creek, join Thistle Creek at the mouth of the
canyons on the east side of the valley. Panawats Slough
rises in some springs in the meadows in Thistle Valley
and flows north, joining Thistle Creek a few rods north
of the county line. This slough also picks up the runoff
from the meadows, (R. 27).
In the year 1894 a decree was entered in the District
Court of Utah County, adjudicating the water rights in
Thistle Creek as between the users in Thistle Valley on
the one side and the users down the canyon on the other
side. We call this the Smith Decree, (R. 14).
In the action which resulted in the Smith Decree
the predecessors in title to all of the parties to this action
were the plaintiffs and the users in Thistle Valley were
defendants. We refer to the Thistle Valley rights as the
Indianola Rights, and the rights of the parties to this
action as the Canyon Rights.
The Smith Decree does not expressly allocate the
rights of the Canyon users as among themselves; and
there has never been an adjudication or any other proceeding until now to establish the rights of the Canyon
users as among themselves.
The Smith Decree, is like many of the earlier decrees,
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somewhat incomplete. It does not give points of diversion nor fix the duty of water, irrigated acreage, etc.
Primarily the decree divided the water for a thirty-day
period, commencing June 15th and ending July 15th of
each year. The parties to this action and their predecessors were given two five-day turns during this periodand the Indianola rights took two ten-day turns 1 . On
July 15th, the Indianola rights were permitted by the
Smith Decree to shut the stream off dry, and the parties
to this action after July 15th get only the return flow
from Thistle Valley, (R. 15).
Historical!}^ it would appear that there generally
has been sufficient water in Thistle Creek and its tribux
The Smith Decree is set out in full at pages 14 and 15 of the Record, and it
may be summarized as follows:

The Indianola Rights have
From June 15th at 6:00 a.m. to June 25th at 6:00 a.m. — All of Thistle
Creek, Clear Creek and Rock Creek.
From June 30th at 6:00 a.m. to July 10th at 6:00 a.m. — All of Thistle
Creek, Clear Creek and Rock Creek.
Also — after July 15 th down to March 1st of the next year — All of
Thistle Creek, Clear Creek and Rock Creek, subject to the rights of the
Canyon users.
The Canyon Rights have
From June 25th at 6:00 a.m. to June 30th at 6:00 a.m.; and from July
10th at 6:00 a.m. to July 15th at 6:00 a.m. — All of Thistle Creek and
one-fourth of Clear Creek and Rock Creek.
Also from March 1st to June 15th — 5 acres from Hyrum Seely Ditch and
7 acres from Panawats Ditch.
Also — During the whole year — all of Panawats Slough and all of Gardner's Dam.
Also — Whenever the waters from Panawats Slough and Gardner's Dam
together with 5 acres from Hyrum Seely Ditch and 7 acres from Panawats
Ditch are less than Vz the flow of Thistle Creek and *4 the flow of Clear
Creek and Rock Creek, then to a sufficient flow from Thistle Creek to
make up the V2 and the XA-
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taries to meet the needs of all of the parties at least
until about the 15th day of May, (E. 257). It also would
appear that from the 15th of May until the 15th of June,
when the Smith decree divided the water into turns as
set forth above, there was always a substantial quantity
of water in the source, (E. 257, 245). The Smith Decree
of 1894 did not describe nor limit the acreage. The court
has in this case, however, determined what the acreage
of each of these parties is and the portion thereof which
is cultivated ground, and the portion thereof which is
meadow. While there was considerable time devoted to
this acreage problem, the findings of the court in this
regard are not questioned on this appeal. Those acreages
are as follows, to-wit: (E. 63)
E. L. Mitchell.... .
Frank Spencer
Theodarius E. McKean
George A. Siler
Sub-Total
A. Adolphus Lasson
Bernard G. Lasson
Neils Oscar Lasson
Glen D. Lasson
Sub-Total
Grand Total

16.62
_ 40.1
76.15
18.7

acres
acres
acres
acres

151.49
224.95
85.05
78.04
88.0

acres
acres
acres
acres
acres

476.04 acres
627.53 acres

During the 30 day period when the water is on turns
with Thistle Valley, the Lassons, who are the defendants
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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and respondents here, do not irrigate their meadows
below the Upper Wimmer Dam, and the water which
reaches the Upper Wimmer Dam is used on the cultivated land, (E. 330, 236-8, 240).
The respondents are generally upstream from the
plaintiffs and appellants, and the velocity of water
through their meadows is such that it would cut a deep
channel unless check dams were maintained therein, (E.
195). These check dams are not high enough to divert
the water out of the channel; they are constructed of
rock which retard the flow of the stream, holding the
ground water table through the meadows at a reasonably
high level and preventing heavy erosion in the channels.
In addition, the respondents maintain diversion dams
which take water from Thistle Creek and on to their
meadows. The respondents contend for the right to
maintain tight dams diverting all of the water from
Thistle Creek on to their lands without regard to the
quantity of water which might be available and without
any regard for the needs of their land. They deny that
the appellants have any right except during the 30 days
when the water is on turns with Thistle Valley to have
any direct flow of water remain in the channel for diversion by the plaintiffs at their lands, (E. 224, 236-8).
The trial court so found and decreed, (E. 67). The
result of this is that the plaintiffs will be essentially
dependent upon return flow from the lands of the
respondents.
Spencer had lived on his ranch for a period of 63
years at the time of the trial, McKean on his since 1911,
5
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and Mitchell had owned his place since 1942, and before
that he leased it. The Lassons are the second generation
of that family to occupy their ranches, (R. 19, 81).
During all the time from as far back as the memory
of any of the witnesses extended right down to the year
1950, there had never been any trouble among these
people about the distribution and use of the water, (R.
232, 290, 306). They got along fine without a watermaster, or water commissioner, or State Engineer, or
anybody else; they distributed the water among themselves, (R. 232). When there was plenty they helped
themselves to it as they felt they needed it. In times
of shortage they shared the loss and seem to have been
considerate of one another's needs, (R. 305-6). In years
of normal precipitation the crops on the Lasson cultivated lands were usually no better or poorer than those
on the Spencer, McKean and Mitchell places; that is
likewise true with respect to the dry years, (R. 286, 261,
257, 231, 88, 56). Some very dry years they all had crop
failures, (R. 54).
Lassons took the water whenever they needed it
and as long as there was any water in the stream; so did
the plaintiffs. If Spencer and McKean needed water
when there was none coming past the Lasson diversion
dams, they would go up the creek and open up the dams
and let some down. At times they would see a Lasson
on his place and mention to him their need for water
and the matter would be amicably arranged between
themselves, (R. 257, 232, 233, 273, 296, 305) but if a
Lasson did not happen to be present they would take
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what they regarded as their fair share of the stream
and turn it down, (R. 84-87).
In 1950, however, something transpired to change
the happy state of affairs which had prevailed among
these ranches on Thistle Creek. There was a case on
trial at Manti in which Arthur R. Lasson sued Justus
0 . Seely for damages and for an injunction for putting
a dam in Panawats Slough. Arthur owned the southernmost Lasson meadow at that time. In that case Arthur
testified that he owned or claimed to own the right to
the use of all of the waters of Panawats Slough. Frank
M. Spencer heard that testimony. It was a surprise to
him to hear such a claim made, for he regarded the
Slough as tributary to Thistle Creek, and thought all
of the Canyon users were entitled to share in the use
of the waters of the slough and that no ranch had the
right to all of the flow of that small stream, (R. 52).
In the discussions which occurred among the parties
following that disclosure of the Lasson claims to the
Slough, appellants were apprised for the first time in
1954 of the claims to the priority of use and exclusive
use of the combined waters of Thistle Creek and Panawats Slough, which they set up in their counterclaim,
and which the trial court sustained by its judgment in
this case, (R. 296-7).
There was plenty of water for everyone in 1952,
but in 1953 and 1954 the Lassons took all the low water;
and the crop on the McKean Ranch, although this ranch
had the right to the use of the Spencer water that season,
was virtually a complete failure, (R. 54, 101, 112, 121-7).
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When the Canyon people take their turns from
Indianola they take the dam out to let the water down
to the lower ranches, (E. 239, 242). The Spencers and
McKeans have to take the dams out through the Lasson
places during low water to let the water on downstream
to their ranches. They have always done this, (Tr. 34).
There is a stretch where the channel has been filled up,
but one can see by the willows where the channel used
to be, (Tr. 36). When the water gets down to that point
it spreads over the meadows, (Tr. 37). On the map
(Exhibit A) the Wimmer Dam is marked Lasson Dam.*
Below that is the Lower Wimmer Dam, (Tr. 38). Then
there is the White House Dam, and below that is the
Spencer-McKean Dam, (Tr. 39).
Since the first portion of our argument must be
devoted to the contention that the facts do not justify
the maintenance of tight dams on Thistle Creek, the
diversion of all the water on the lands of the respondents
and the depriving of the plaintiffs of direct flow, we
forego a further discussion of the facts at this point.
P O I N T S ON A P P E A L
I. The court erred in finding and decreeing that
the defendants hold rights to the use of the water of
Thistle Creek and its tributaries which are prior to the
rights of the plaintiffs.
II. The court erred in finding and decreeing that
the defendants should be permitted to maintain tight
dams in Thistle Creek and to divert all of the waters
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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accumulating therein without regard to the beneficial
needs of their land.
III. The court erred in finding and decreeing that
the defendants could maintain a tight dam at a point
which is known as the Upper Wimmer Dam until May
15th, diverting all waters which accumulated at that
point.
IV. The court erred in finding and decreeing that
from May 15th until June 15th of each year the plaintiffs McKean and Spencer are only entitled to one-fifth
of the water accumulating at their dam.
V. The court erred in failing to determine and
decree a duty of water for the lands of the defendants
and in refusing to determine the other elements of an
appropriation, including points of diversion, rates of
flow, period of use, etc.
VI. The court erred in failing to place all of the
parties hereto on an equal priority, duty, period of use,
etc., and failing to divide the waters of Thistle Creek
and its tributaries among said parties in direct proportion to the acreage owned by each.
VII. The court erred in assessing all of the costs
against the plaintiffs.
AEGUMENT
We realize that some of the statements of point
made above overlap. Basically the two main points of
the case involved a r e : (1) Should the court have given
to the defendants a prior right senior to the rights of
9
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any of the plaintiffs to the waters of Thistle Creek;
and (2) should the court have totally disregarded all of
the elements of the doctrine of appropriation and beneficial use, and simply given to the defendants the right to
maintain tight dams in Thistle Creek to divert and use
all of the water, leaving to the plaintiffs only the return
flow? I t is our basic contention that the priority of all
of the parties should be equal, that the water should
have been divided among all of the parties to this suit
in direct proportion to the irrigated acreage of each,
and that reasonable regulations should have been placed
on the use of the water by all of the parties. We realize
that the court has found the issues of fact against us,
and, therefore, in the presentation of the factual argument will essentially confine ourselves to the evidence
adduced by the defendants. We do this, although this
is an equity case. (Leland v. Bourne, 41 Utah 125, 125
Pac. 652). This court has on numerous occasions discussed the extent of its review in equity cases and has
held that it can and should review both the law and the
facts, but that it should not disturb the findings of the
trial court, unless the Supreme Court is satisfied from
all the evidence that the findings are contrary to the
preponderance thereof. See Webb v. Webb, 116 Utah
155, 209 Pac. 2d 201; and Hatch v. W. S. Hatch Compcmy,
3 Utah 2d 295, 283 P. 2d 217. We believe that the preponderance of the evidence is clearly against the conclusion of the court to the effect that respondents have
the senior right. We think that on their own testimony
the court could not reasonably have found that they
had rights senior and prior to those of the plaintiffs.
10
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I. T H E COURT E R R E D IN FINDING AND DEC R E E I N G T H A T T H E D E F E N D A N T S HOLD
R I G H T S TO T H E U S E OF T H E W A T E R S OF
T H I S T L E C R E E K AND I T S T R I B U T A R I E S
W H I C H A R E PRIOR TO T H E R I G H T S OF T H E
PLAINTIFFS.
All of these parties or their predecessors in interest
were parties to a suit which was completed in 1894, and
which resulted in the entry of the Smith Decree, (R. 2124). None of the parties attempted to show the origin
of his water right prior to the Smith Decree, and there
is no testimony to the effect that any particular individual made an appropriation which was prior in time
to the appropriation of any other individual. Each
merely started with the Smith Decree. The testimony
was, therefore, confined to the custom which has prevailed since that time. Prior to 1903 no statutory filing
was necessary 2 . The existence of valid appropriations
is, therefore, not questioned.
The Smith Decree made no effort to divide the water
between these parties. There is simply a division of
the waters of Thistle Creek between Thistle Valley or
Indianola on the one hand, and these parties (the Canyon
rights) on the other. This court has noted that when a
court makes a joint award, the division between the
various individuals is left open for further proceedings
to divide the water so jointly awarded. See Gill v. Tracy,
80 Utah 127, 13 P. 2d 329. We believe that the testimony
of the defendants shows conclusively that the plaintiffs
2

Wellsville-East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock, 104 Utah 448,
137 P. 2d 634; Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 189 P. 2d 701.

11 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

have always had their proportionate share of the water
and that they have not been relegated to a junior
position.
The defendants were specifically asked whether or
not back over the years the plaintiffs had had their
Xjroportionate share of the water, and they answered
that question in the affirmative, (R. 255, 231). For
example, Glen Lasson (R. 231) testified as follows:
" Q . Well during all those years did you ever
know or hear when Spencer and McKean didn't
get enough water to jjroduce a crop? A. They
got as much water as anyone else did proportionately, I think.
" Q . That is what I mean.
the cultivated area.

A. Now that is for

" Q . Yes, I am referring now to the cultivated
area. A. There were some years when possibly
the Wimmer Field would get water when there
would be no water for Frank Spencer and McKean, because I think it is a prior right.''
He goes on to state that the water was always administered simply by the agreement of the users (R. 232),
that McKean and Spencer would simply come up and
say that they needed water, that he would look at it and
let him have what he judged was about one-fourth (R.
233), and that he would let them have about one-fourth
of the water which accumulated at the Wimmer Dam,
(R. 233). Bernard Lasson said the amount they got
was one-fifth, (R. 303).
Arthur Lasson also said plaintiffs got their proportion of the water (R. 255) " t h e same proportion as we
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law12
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would have I imagine after May 1 5 . "
Bernard Lasson testified that when Spencer and
McKean came upstream for water there was never a
time when he told them they could not have water, (R.
290); they looked at the stream and if plaintiffs did not
have their share he would release water to them, (R.
301, 305, 306).
Because all of these parties or their predecessors
were parties to the suit in 1894 which resulted in the
Smith Decree, (R. 21-24) it was freely admitted by all
concerned that they have been using the waters in question since at least that date. The defendants consistently
testified that except during extreme drouth periods the
parties have been able to raise good crops. For example,
Arthur Lasson testified: (R. 257)
"Q." You know very well that they (plaintiffs)
raised just about as good a crops as you did!
A. Yes sir.
" Q . And as your brothers did on their irrigated
lands? A. That's right."
Mr. Lasson also said that plaintiffs came up
the water sometimes and sometimes Bernard
turned it down; that he felt that plaintiffs were
to the water, and that " w e don't deny they are
to the water," (R. 257).

and got
Lasson
entitled
entitled

Glen Lasson (R. 286) testified that the plaintiffs'
crops generally were about as good as the Lassons, that
their crops "were about the same."
Of course, the plaintiffs all likewise so testified; that
13 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is, that they and their predecessors had lived on the
lands since prior to the Smith Decree; that they until
the last three or four years when this suit arose matured
their crops about the same as have the defendants, (R.
54, 88, 112-114).
The defendants admit that plaintiffs have come upstream for water over the years; that they have never
been refused water, and that defendants have never told
the plaintiffs that defendants' rights were superior to
plaintiffs. In this regard Glen Lasson said (R. 232)
that the water was always handled by agreement of the
users; that McKean and Spencer would come upstream
for water, and that Lassons would let them have about
one-fourth of the water accumulating at the Upper
Wimmer Dam, (R. 233). Bernard said about one-fifth,
(R. 303). Arthur Lasson testified that he has divided
the water with McKean and Spencer from about May
15th forward to June 15th, when the water goes on turn
with the Thistle Valley users, (R. 245). He testified that
he had maintained a tight dam up until May 15th, and
that after May 15th Spencer and McKean had the same
proportionate amount of water as he did, (R. 255).
Specifically he said:
" Q . Do you know about whether McKean generally had just about as good crops on his cultivated ground as your brothers and you had on
yours up there? A. Most of the time, yes.
" Q . Did they have sufficient water generally
when there was water available to the rest of
you? A. They had the same proportion as we
would have I imagine after the 15th of May.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 14
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" Q . Well, when did they have to water their grain
in the spring! A. About the same time as we
would have on o u r s . "
# # #
" Q . Whenever they needed water on their grain
they came up and got it? A. Came up where?
" Q . To wherever the water was. A. Well, if
they had water in the ditch to water with they
wouldn't come nowheres." (R. 256)
# * #
" Q . You know very w^ell that they raised just
about as good crops as you did? A. Yes sir.
" Q . And as your brothers did on their irrigated
land? A. That's right.
" Q . Where did they get the water to do that?
A. There was the return flow of this stream back
into the creek until the 15th of May. Then we
would make some division with them at the lower
dam, the New House dam, until the 15th of June.
" Q . Did you make that division, or did they come
up and get it ? A. Well sometimes they came up
and got it, but sometimes Bernard turned it down.
" Q . Felt as if they were entitled to the water?
A. We don't deny they are entitled to the water.''
(E. 257)
Bernard Lasson, who apparently did much of the
dividing, testified (E. 272) that while the Lassons kept
tight dams in the stream until May 15th, there was
almost always enough water in the stream until that
time to take care of the plaintiffs. (The trial court
found there was enough to June 25, (E. 64-5).) He was
explaining the manner in which the water was used and
said:
" 'i I would like to state that up until the 15th of
15
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May generally there was plenty of water for us
and them too, so that it was not necessary to
interfere with the dams and let water down to
them. At the time of the 15th of May we let
them have some water if the water stream was
down, so that we didn't all have plenty or enough
at that time we figured on about one-fifth of the
water going dowrn to them between the 15th of
May and the 15th of June. Of course, on the 15th
of June, Indianola took the water and there was
no wrater for anyone."
Bernard Lasson went on to say at pages 294 and
296 that while he claims the right to maintain a tight
dam up until May 15th, that this claim was made in
view of the fact that there is usually ample water for
all of the parties until that date. He was asserting the
"claim" that he could keep a tight dam even when the
water was short. However, there is no testimony from
him to the effect that he did so, and in explaining his
claim he interrupted counsel twice to explain that usually
there was no problem until the 15th of May, (E. 296),
that there was plenty of water for everyone until then.
Mr. Lasson admits that historically he had never
advised the plaintiffs about this claimed May 15th date
and that he first made this claim to take all of the water,
if necessary, until the 15th of May during the year 1954,
when the parties were discussing a settlement of this
matter. He also said that plaintiffs did not agree, (B.
297). He never in all of the time he operated his ranch
turned Spencer or McKean down when they came upstream for the water (E. 301); that he gave them about
one-fifth of the stream at the Upper Wimmer Dam, (E.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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303). He reiterated at page 305 that he never refused
their request for water and he again repeated that at
Record 306 although at times when they looked at the
stream it was concluded that they were getting their
share.
It is inconceivable to us that for fifty years the
plaintiffs could be coming upstream in the spring of the
year when they got short of water that they would see
the Lassons (respondents) and request that they be
given some water; that during that fifty-year period
they would never be refused water; that during the
entire period the Lassons would never once assert a
prior right or superior claim, and that the parties would
not once mention or discuss the proposition that the
Lassons had the right to maintain a tight dam and take
all of the water until May 15th. The Lessons freely
admit that when the water got short (and they say this
would happen about May 15th) "so that there was not
enough for all of the parties," they would share the
water with the plaintiffs. It is inconceivable that they
would share the water when it was short, but would not
pro-rate during high water prior to May 15th, (R. 272).
We submit that from the record it is conclusively
shown that until about the 15th of May there was usually
plenty of water for everyone. The trial court found that
in normal years there is plenty until June 25, (Finding
No. 9, P. 65). The parties would use the water which
accumulated at their respective points of diversion, and
each would generally have all he needed. This was true
of the Indianola right also. As the stream receded and
17
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there was not enough water for all to use all they needed,
(R. 272) the plaintiffs would move upstream looking for
water. They would meet the Lassons and request water,
and in fifty years the Lassons did not refuse their request
on a single occasion, (R. 305, 306). They would all look
at the stream and release one-fourth according to Glen
Lasson (R. 233) and one-fifth according to Bernard Lasson, (R. 303). Thus, when the flow was high, all took
what they needed. When water got short, the Lassons
would share with the plaintiffs. This division of the
waters was generally necessary after about May 15th.
On June 15th, Indianola then took the water for ten days
under the Smith Decree. The water was then turned
back to all of the parties (both plaintiffs and defendants)
for five days, (R. 236). During this five-day period the
defendants did not contend for the right to irrigate their
meadows, (R. 240). The dams were all taken out, (R.
239) the waters from the main tributary known as Panawats Slough were permitted to flow uninterruptedly and
commingle with the waters of Thistle Creek, (R. 242),
and the water during this five-day period was divided
between the plaintiffs and the defendants for their
cultivated grain and alfalfa lands on the basis of onefourth to the plaintiffs and three-fourths to the defendants, (R. 239). Indianola then took the water for an
additional ten days under the Smith Decree and then
it again came back to all these parties (plaintiffs and
defendants) for five more days, (R. 236-39). Again
during these five days the water was divided one-fourth
to the plaintiffs, and three-fourths to the defendants,
and at that time Indianola took all the water under the
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Smith Decree for the rest of the season and for all
intents and purposes the irrigation season is over, (R.
241).
It is utterly fantastic for a court to hold that during
extreme low water the plaintiffs were on an equal priority and pro-rated the water; but during high water the
defendants have the superior right, and refused to prorate. This is exactly opposite to the way all water rights
in the West become vested. During high water when
there is enough to permit it, all users take what they
want. When the water recedes, those with senior rights
cut off those with junior rights, and during extreme low
w^ater only the primary users get water. If the District
Court's judgment is permitted to stand in this case,
plaintiffs and defendants are treated as having equal
priority during extreme low water and during the
period of intermittent flow, but they are placed in a
junior position during high water prior to May 15th.
We respectfully submit that this court should set
aside the District Court's findings and its decree to the
extent that the same purport to grant to the defendants
the senior and prior right to divert the waters of Thistle
Creek and to take all of the water away from the plaintiffs, except return flow, until a rigid date of May 15th.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PLACE
REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE
OF WATER.
The court by its decree placed no restrictions whatsoever on the use of water by the defendants. They are
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decreed to have the right to keep water-tight dams in
Thistle Creek and to use all of the water diverted thereby, (R. 72). It is clear under the evidence that there
are at times more than 20 c.f.s. of water in Thistle Creek 3
and the court so found in Finding No. 8, (R. 64).
Testimony was adduced by respondents to the effect
that the stream varies from day to day and season to
season, and that because of this fluctuation it is impractical to take the water on turns, (R. 275). There was
also testimony adduced by the defendants to the effect
that this is a closed basin, and that water diverted on
to the Lasson (Respondents) lands will yield some return
flow to the stream. The percentage of return flow varies
according to the quantity of water diverted to the lands.
Engineer Jacobs, a witness of the respondents, testified
that the percentage of water returning to the stream
would vary with the time of year and the discharge of
the stream. The percentage would be as high as 60 per
cent in the early part of the season and later on the
return flow would probably go down to 30 per cent, (R.
362). Respondent Glen Lasson testified, (R. 330) that
if the Lassons diverted 5 c.f.s. of water on to their
meadows " t h a t almost none of that would r e t u r n " to
the stream. He also testified that if 20 c.f.s. were diverted
by the Lassons, 50 per cent would return.
Because of the fact that the lands of these users
are in a closed basin, and surplus water diverted to the
3
Glen Lasson, an engineer, testified that five inches of water over their six foot
weir would yield 7 c.f.s. of water, (R. 3 7 0 ) . Arthur R. Lasson testified that at
times the water flows 20 inches deep over that weir, making flows as high as
28 c.f.s., (R. 166).
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land will return to the stream channel, and because the
stream flow fluctuates from day to day and season to
season, the District Court permitted the Lassons to
maintain tight dams in the channel diverting all of the
water on to their lands and leaving to the appellants
only the return flow. We think that it is obvious from
the manner in which the stream is administered when
it is on turns with Indianola that it is not necessary to
administer the stream in this fashion. During those
times, the tight dams are taken out and the water is
allowed to run directly down the channel to the appellants. All of the witnesses so testified, (E. 151, 219, 239).
See for example the testimony of Glen Lasson, (E. 330).
Engineer Jacob also testified that it would be practical
to turn the stream down direct, (E. 372), and that letting
part of the stream run directly down the channel would
be one practical system for handling the water, (E. 375).
We readily concede that a variable stream is difficult
to administer. However, this court has recently held
that this fact does not justify diverting more water onto
the land than it can beneficially use.
The case is McNaughton v. Eaton, Case No. 8277.
The first decision in this case is reported in 242 P . 2d
570 (Utah), and the last decision is not yet reported.
The case is directly in point. In the McNaughton case
the court expressly found that the flow of water in McNaughton Gulch varied from day to day and season to
season; that at times the flow was negligible, and that
at other times it flowed several c.f.s. The trial court in
this case also so found, (E. 64).
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The court also expressly found in the McNaughton
case that there was a drain ditch across the entire lower
end of McNaughton's field which returned the entire
surplus flow from McNaughton's land directly back to
the McNaughton Gulch at a point upstream from any
of the other points of diversion. I n this case the court
also so found, (R. 65).
The trial court in the McNaughton case permitted
McNaughton on the first trial to maintain tight dams in
the McNaughton Gulch, and to divert all of the water
accumulating therein on to his land. McNaughton argued
on appeal that even though the quantity thus diverted
exceeded a reasonable duty, nevertheless the drain ditch
would return all surplus immediately back to the gulch
so that no one was prejudiced. In the McNaughton case,
only 66 acres were involved. The lands were situated
on both sides of the gulch and, as here, there clearly
was no other place for the water to go, except back to
the gulch. The findings on a variable and fluctuating
stream and on return flow were thus identical to the
court's findings here.
On the first appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held
that the trial court had erred in permitting McNaughton
to take the water without reasonable limitations on his
use. The case was remanded with instructions to the
District Court to determine the extent of the restrictions. After the case was remanded the trial court placed
restrictions on McNaughton, and McNaughton appealed.
On the second appeal the Supreme Court held that
because of the variable flow it was not reasonable to
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restrict McNaughton to a maximum rate of flow of 2
c.f.s., for at times he might have to take the entire flow
in order to get 15 acre feet of water for each ten-day
turn. McNaughton also urged on the second appeal that
because of the variable stream and the fact that surplus
would return to the channel, the most practical method
of use was to let him divert the entire stream and let
the downstream users who held junior rights depend on
the return flow. The Supreme Court refused to follow
this theory and expressly affirmed the trial court in
establishing a duty of 3.5 acre feet of water per acre
of land per year during the 150 day irrigation season.
It permitted McNaughton to divert, without restriction,
water at a sufficient rate of flow to yield a total of
fifteen acre feet of water during each ten-day period,
but when he had diverted that quantity, the court required him to release the balance of the water downstream to the junior appropriators.
In this case w-e, of course, deny (as argued under
Section I) that we are junior to the respondents. But
as to this point that does not matter. Even if the
respondents have a senior right, we think that under
the holdings of the McNaughton case the trial court
should have fixed the duty of water and restricted
respondents to the quantity of water which their lands
reasonably need. Water not needed by respondents
should, in any event, be left in the channel to run downstream directly to appellants.
There apparently is no practical difficulty in the
establishment of diversion dams which will divert to the
23 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Lassons only the water they can beneficially use. We say
this, because during the time when the water is on turn
with the Indianola users, the appellants are permitted
to get their water direct, and are not restricted to the
use only of the return flow, (E. 151, 219, 239, 330). Also,
Engineer Jacob, called by the respondents, testified that
it would be practical to turn the stream down directly
to appellants, and that this would be one practical system of irrigation, (B. 372, 375).
We, therefore, respectfully urge that without regard
to what this court holds, as to the matters argued under
Section I of this brief, the trial court committed prejudicial error in decreeing to the respondents the right to
maintain tight dams in Thistle Creek and to divert all
of the water from the channel without regard to the
duty of water, or the needs of their land. We do not
believe that it is possible to distinguish the McNaugMon
case from this one. The evidence in the McNaugMon
case overwhelmingly demonstrated that since 1888 McNaughton had maintained at least two, and at times
three, tight dams across McNaughton Gulch, and that
for more than 60 years he had diverted all of the water
that accumulated therein. The evidence also overwhelmingly established the fact that McNaughton was the
senior appropriator, that he had used the wTater prior
to any use by the defendants. Yet, in the McNaugMon
case this court squarely held that McNaughton should
only have been permitted to divert to his land a total of
3.5 acre feet of water per acre of land, per irrigation
season. This was divided into 15 turns, and McNaughton
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was restricted to fifteen acre feet of water each ten days
for his 66 acres of land.
We submit that the trial court has erred in granting
to the Lassons the right to maintain numerous tight
dams diverting to their lands the total flow of Thistle
Creek, and leaving to appellants only the return flow,
and this is true without regard to whether appellants
have an equal priority with respondents, (as appellants
urge) or whether respondents have the senior right (as
respondents contend).
I I I . T H E COURT E R R E D IN D E C R E E I N G T H A T
T H E D E F E N D A N T S COULD MAINTAIN A
TIGHT DAM A T A P O I N T W H I C H I S KNOWN
A S T H E U P P E R WIMMER DAM U N T I L MAY
15th OF E A C H YEAR.
This Point No. I l l is partially discussed above. The
court has expressly decreed that the Lassons need not
share nor pro-rate the water with the plaintiffs until
May 15th. We do not believe that the evidence will
justify such a finding, although at one point in his testimony Arthur Lasson so stated, (R. 245). We think that
the testimony of the respondents on this point is inconsistent, and also contrary to experience of mankind. It
is also in conflict with testimony of the plaintiffs, and
the trial court should not have adopted it.
The trial court has found that until the 25th day of
June of each year " there is during the normal year
more than sufficient water to supply the needs of all the
parties to this proceeding." (Finding No. 9, R. 65). If
this finding is correct, then there has not been a need
25 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for pro-rating the water until the water went on turns
with Indianola during the normal water year. Nevertheless, Arthur Lasson testified that beginning the 15th
day of May and continuing until the turn system with
Indianola he has prorated with the plaintiffs, McKean
and Spencer, (R, 233). Bernard Lasson also so testified,
(R. 272). He also said (R. 273):
" At the time of the 15th of May we let them have
some water if the stream was down, so that we
didn't all have plenty or enough and at that time
we figured on about one-fifth of the water going
down to them between the 15th of May and the
15th of June. Of course, the 15th of June Indianola took the water and there was no water for
anyone."
If this May 15th date were a date that had become
fixed through usage and custom as a rigid date, it would
have been proper to base the decree on it. But at page
297 it was admitted by the respondents that this particular date had never even been discussed until the Fall
of 1954. Bernard Lasson testified at page 296 of the
Record that they claimed the right to take all of the
water until May 15th, but he interrupted counsel to state,
" I would like to add that there is usually ample for all
the parties until that date." He was asked when he first
made his claim to the water until May 15th known to
the plaintiffs and he answered, " First time we ever discussed proportionate water rights with them" in the
Fall of 1954. He was then specifically asked if this May
15th date had ever been discussed before and he
answered, "never discussed it with them before."
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" Q . Never had any occasion to discuss it?
Yes, never have.

A.

" Q . So that so far as you know they didn't know
that you asserted such a claim? A. I don't know
what they knew.''
The parties were having an argument about their
water in the Fall of 1954, (E. 296). In endeavoring to
settle this difference, Lasson, for the first time in nearly
60 years, asserted that plaintiffs could not pro-rate the
water prior to May 15th. This is the first time that date
ever came into discussion. Every party who testified
admitted that when there was plenty of water in the
stream during high water the plaintiffs simply diverted
the water accumulating at their points of diversion, (E.
233). When the water got short, so that there was not
enough for all, plaintiffs went upstream to get their
water, (E. 94, 233, 255, 262, 288, 305). Every witness
who testified about this subject matter readily so admitted.
Since all of the parties admit that the plaintiffs came
upstream for water when there was not enough at their
headgates, this we think must be accepted as an uncontradicted fact. To this must be added the additional
admitted fact that in the sixty years while the parties
were following such a practice the defendants never on
even a single occasion verbally told the plaintiffs that
they could not have water.
At page 290 Bernard Lasson testified that " there
has never been a time, as I remember it, that I have
told them they couldn't have a n y " water. He was inter-
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rupted by counsel and indicated he had not completed
his answer, and he said:
" A . May I explain what I did do. I didn't say
anything only I would look at the water and see
how it w a s . "
On re-direct examination he was again asked about
when Spencer and McKean came up and asked for additional water. He said that he never did tell Spencer and
McKean on those occasions that they didn't have any
right to any water and that the nature of the arrangement was that he would go and look at the water " a n d
see how it w a s . " If it was between the 15th of May and
the 15th of June " I figured they should have 1/5 of the
water that hit the Upper Wimmer D a m , " and if they
didn't have that such, " i n my estimation," he turned it
down to them. He said that they left it to him to tend
the water and that if he didn't turn enough down they
would come up and complain, and " w e would go through
the same process again." And they never objected to
that method of operation, (R. 302).
He was asked again about their asking for water
on re-cross, (E. 304). The witness said that it was not
true, that he let Spencer and McKean " h a v e what water
they wanted," but (R. 305)
" I don't know that I ever denied them any water,
but there is lots of times that I didn't turn them
down any. I simply said ' I will go look at the
stream.'
" Q . Well, did you ever say to either one of them,
'Now you can have this much, but you can't have
this much', and point out just how much they
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could have?
(E. 305).

A. No I don't think I ever d i d . "

From the above testimony only one conclusion is
possible. The parties during high water got all of the
water they needed at their respective dams. When the
stream receded, Spencer and McKean would go upstream
and usually see one of the Lassons. They would tell him
that they needed some water. The parties would go look
at the stream and if plaintiff's share of the stream was
going on down to Spencer and McKean they would not
make any adjustments to the dam. If they were not
getting their water, then the dam would be changed so
as to pro-rate the water between them, and this method
would continue until the water went on turns with
Indianola.
It simply is contrary to the common experience of
man that for 60 years the Lassons could have maintained a senior position on the stream without on a
single occasion having asserted it. I t is from the Lassons' own testimony that we are told that the claiming
of a prior right before May 15th was made for the first
time during the trial, (E. 292). I t is also from the
Lassons that we learn that Spencer and McKean came
up for the water "when there was not enough for all of
u s , " (E. 273), and that Lassons never on a single occasion in sixty years told them they could not have any
water, (E. 305); that they would go and look at the
stream " a n d see how it w a s . " If plaintiffs were getting
their share, Lasson did not turn any more down; if not
he would release some. If he did not release enough,
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they would again complain and "we would go through
the process again," (R. 302).
Again and again Lassons said that they never verbally told plaintiffs they couldn't have any water, but at
times after looking at the stream and seeing the amount
already going down to them they made the decision not
to turn any more down.
If during the past sixty years Lassons had the
prior right, certainly on at least one occasion when
Spencer and McKean came upstream looking for water
Lassons would have asserted that prior right. It is certain that in sixty years the season did not always break
on exactly May 15th, and that McKean and Spencer
would have been short of water prior to that time. Still
the Lassons never said in effect, " I t is not May 15th
yet, and you can't have any water."
The court would have to find from the testimony of
the defendants that they did pro-rate the water with the
plaintiffs when plaintiffs requested water, and, of course,
the plaintiffs all testified that such was the case. "When
this is added to the fact that the defendants have said
that the plaintiffs got proportionaely as much water as
did the defendant (R. 231, 255); that year in and year
out they raised crops about the same as did the defendants, (R. 257, 261, 286), the decree of the court giving
to the defendants the primary right on the stream simply
can not stand.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO SPENCER
AND McKEAN ONLY ONE-FIFTH OF THE
WATER ACCUMULATING IN THEIR DAM.
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The Lassons do not themselves concur in their
testimony that the plaintiffs are only entitled to 1/5 of
the water reaching the Upper Wimmer Dam. Arthur
Lasson testified that he did not deny that plaintiffs were
entitled to the water, (E. 262). He also testified that
they were entitled to about 1/4 of the water reaching
the Upper Wimmer Dam, (R. 232-3). Bernard Lasson
also recognized the right of the plaintiffs to receive
water accumulating at the Upper Wimmer Dam after
May 15th. But he said they were only entitled to 1/5
of the water, (R. 273, 292). Since the testimony in this
regard was coming from the defendants personally, there
is no justification for the trial court accepting the testimony of the defendants most favorable to them. One
of the defendants said " 1 / 4 " and one said " 1 / 5 " . On
an acreage basis the division would have been about 25
per cent to plaintiffs and 75 per cent to Lassons.
It should also be noted that after the water goes on
turns with Indianola, the division is 1/4 to the plaintiffs and 3/4 to the defendants, and no explanation is
given by Bernard Lasson as to why the change. As
noted, Arthur Lasson testified that plaintiffs were entitled to 1/4 of the water when about May 15th the water
receded to a point where there was not enough for all
the parties. In an equity case where the court can review
the fact as well as the law, we submit that the evidence
in this regard strongly preponderates in favor of the
plaintiffs in the following particulars :
(a) The defendants admit that after May 15th at
least, the plaintiffs got their proportionate share of
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the water, (R. 232, 255).
(b) Defendants admit that plaintiffs' crops were
just as good as the defendants, year in and year out,
(R. 257, 261, 286).
(c) One of the Lassons testified that plaintiffs got
1/4 of the water after May 15th, (R. 232-3).
(d) All of the defendants admit that after the
water goes on turn with Indianola, the plaintiffs'
share is 1/4 of all the water, (R. 51, 239).
(e) On an acreage basis, the pro-ration between
the plaintiffs and the defendants would give to the
plaintiffs 1/4 of all the water.
(f) The plaintiffs all say that they always got
their proportionate share until the last three or four
years.
Against all of this we have the testimony of Bernard
Lasson that he would estimate the stream released to
the plaintiffs as being about 1/5 of the stream. He
confesses that the 1/5 figure was never discussed until
the day of the trial; that he and the plaintiffs merely
looked at the stream and estimated whether or not they
had their fair share of the water. If they did, the dam
was not disturbed. If they did not he released more,
but in determining whether or not they had their fair
share, he confesses that this figure of 1/5 was never
discussed. We respectfully submit that the finding of
the court and decree in this regard is against the preponderance of the evidence.
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We also wish to expressly note that in this regard
the Lassons are only testifying concerning the amount
of water which comes to the Upper Wimmer Dam. We
contend that we are entitled to approximately 25 per
cent of all the water available to the canyon users on
an acreage basis, and this includes Thistle Creek and
all of its tributaries, including Panawats Slough. When
the water goes on turn with Indianola, the dams are
taken out of Panawats Slough and it is permitted to
commingle with the waters of Thistle Creek, and the
plaintiffs share in the entire combined stream on a 1/4
basis. Unquestionably proper credit should be given to
the defendants for such return flow as there is, but the
court should finally decree to the plaintiffs the right to
receive 25 per cent of all the water, and not merely the
water which reaches the Upper Wimmer Dam. We
reach the 25 per cent figure by looking at the acreage
as found by the court. The Lassons have 476 acres,
and the plaintiffs, including Mr. Siler, whose interest
is common with the plaintiffs, have 151.57 acres, and
this in round figures is 25 per cent of the total.

V. THE COUET SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED
THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF APPROPRIATION.
This point likewise has been covered in the general
discussion above. The water is certainly governed by
the doctrine of appropriation and the decree purporting
to adjudicate the rights of the parties to use the public
water should have been complete. We again cite the
case of McNaughton v. Eaton, supra, as authority for
the proposition that the facts here do not justify com-
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pletely ignoring all of the elements of the appropriation
doctrine. Certainly the court should have determined
the reasonable needs of the lands of the parties, the
length of the irrigation season, the points of diversion,
and other similar matters. The desirability of a decree
being definite and certain with regard to the elements
of appropriation can hardly be denied. See Sharp v.
Whitmore, 51 Utah 14,, 168 Pac. 273; Francis v. Roberts,
73 Utah 98, 272 Pac. 633; Elmer v. McCtme, 29 Utah 320,
81 Pac. 159, and McNaughton v. Eaton, supra.
VI. I T W A S ERRONEOUS TO AWARD T H E COSTS
AGAINST T H E P L A I N T I F F S .
Under the Utah rules, costs need not automatically
be awarded against the losing party, but rather the
court has discretion to otherwise provide. See Rule
54(d), where in Explanatory it is stated that the rule
leaves the matter of costs "somewhat to the discretion
of the court, and to that extent is inconsistent with our
present statutory provisions." Here it is obvious that
the parties have needed a court decree to define their
rights. They had met in the Fall of 1954 to attempt to
resolve their differences and when they could not do
so the decision was reached to let the court decide their
dispute, (R. 296-7). A decree is just as necessary and
desirable from the standpoint of the defendants as it is
from the standpoint of the plaintiffs. Of course, if the
judgment and decree are set aside under one of the
points argued above, the judgment for costs should fail
anyway, but we think where parties come into court for
the purpose of getting a decree defining with definite-
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ness what their water rights are, the court ought in the
exercise of its discretion to assess the costs among the
parties on some equitable basis, such as requiring each
party to stand his own costs and apportioning the costs
on the basis of the quantity of water awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
DILWORTH WOOLLEY
EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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